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Abstract
Following the collapse of property values and an increasing rate of default on high-risk
mortgages, the United States experienced a subprime lending crisis that led to massive
financial losses for holders of mortgage-backed securities. The purpose of this
correlational study was to examine if loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood
of loan foreclosure. The theoretical framework grounding the study was Minsky’s
financial instability hypothesis, which describes the basis of capitalism as economic
expansionism followed by financial crises. The population consisted of 473 loan cases
from archival data of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in Georgia. The method
used to collect the data was a probabilistic simple random sample taken from the archival
data. The use of binary logistic regression resulted in a finding that the variables of loan
product and loan amount significantly predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure, χ2(4)
= 10.65, p = .031, Nagelkerke R2 = .09. The Nagelkerke R2 value indicated that the
model explained 9% of the variability in foreclosure. The findings specifically showed
that Federal Housing Authority and Veterans Administration loan products were
significantly more likely than conventional loans to cause losses for mortgage lenders.
The implications for positive social change include increased stakeholder knowledge of
various factors that can contribute to foreclosure and sustainment of community value
with fewer homeowners losing their home in foreclosure.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
The cause of the subprime lending crisis that began in 2007 was a rush among
lenders to offer risky home loans to consumers (Donadelli, 2015). The rise of privatelabel, mortgage-backed securities led to the proliferation of risky investments (Horton,
2013). Prior to the crisis, which was a period in which private lenders approved loans
with additional risk, federal lending regulations were inadequate (Razaki, Koprowski, &
Manizha, 2013). Many subprime loan consumers were obtaining high-rate mortgages,
despite an analysis of credit histories and financial positions demonstrating their inability
to fulfill such financial obligations (Razaki et al., 2013).
Following new policies enacted after the 2007 subprime lending crisis,
researchers and economists remained engaged in understanding the crisis, its effects, and
the relationships among various factors (Avery & Brevoort, 2015; Boysen-Hogrefe,
Jannsen, & Meier, 2015; Dong & Hansz, 2016; Fox, 2015; Hall, Crowder, & Spring,
2015; Huang & Yeh, 2015; Mukerji, Saeed, & Tan, 2015; Spahr & Sunderman, 2014).
Researchers’ sustained interest in the crisis has occurred partly because, as Fox (2015)
explained, the effects of the crisis would continue for many years, especially in regions
with high rates of negative home equity (Raymond, 2016). To create policies to prevent
similar financial crises in the future, an understanding of factors surrounding mortgage
default, such as correlations between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure
(Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015) was necessary. That was the focus of this study.
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Background of the Problem
After the recession of 2007–2009 ended in the United States, many housing
markets throughout the country remain in periods of recovery extending well into the
century’s second decade (Raymond, 2016). With regard to the lending crisis, research
exists on the effect of U.S. federal government policies (Avery & Brevoort, 2015),
differences in strengths and recoveries of major and normal mortgage crises (BoysenHogrefe et al., 2015), and the influence of household financial decisions (Mukerji et al.,
2015). Despite the range of existing research, the subprime lending crisis remains a
highly relevant topic of study with significant knowledge gaps. One gap concerns the
correlation between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure in areas with high
percentages of negative equity homes.
Although the economic ripples from the housing bubble occurred throughout the
United States, the focus of this study was on mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry,
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Sixth Federal Reserve District in Atlanta,
Georgia. This district had the highest rate of negative equity in the United States (Alm,
Buschman, & Sjoquist, 2014; Georgia Watch, 2010; Raymond, 2016). In 2014, 23% of
the homes in the Sixth District had negative equity (Zillow, 2016). The results of this
study may contribute to developing and implementing home lending policies that are
more effective and provide lenders with clearer insight into the relationship between loan
product, loan amount, and foreclosure in regions with high rates of negative home equity.
The subprime lending crisis led to significant losses, including bankruptcies in the
banking industry (Lu & Whidbee, 2013). An indicator of dire economic situations for
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both consumers and lenders was high foreclosure rates in many states, including Georgia.
Consequently, leaders of banks, mortgage lending companies, and other lending
institutions may have an interest in understanding factors that affect the riskiness of home
loans, such as loan product and loan amount. The findings from the study include new
information on the relationship between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure that
lenders might use to improve home lending policies.
Problem Statement
The root of the subprime lending crisis was poor economic and regulatory
decisions made by lenders (Lu & Whidbee, 2013). As of 2014, the average U.S.
foreclosure rate was one out of every 1,199 homes (Lersch, Sellers, & Cromwell, 2015).
The general business problem is that mortgage lenders lose profits from high rates of
consumer foreclosure. The specific business problem is that some mortgage lenders do
not know if loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine if loan
product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The predictor
variables were loan product and loan amount. The criterion variable was foreclosure.
The population consisted of data records of mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry,
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in
Georgia between 2013 and 2016. Lenders may use results from this study to improve
their understanding of factors associated with increased foreclosure risks. Implications
for positive social change include improved stakeholder understanding of the
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correlations, if any, between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure that may be
useful in developing and implementing less risky lending policies.
Nature of the Study
The focus of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the degree of
statistical significance of the correlation, if any, between the predictor variables, loan
product and loan amount, and a criterion variable, foreclosure, in Clayton, Henry,
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in
Georgia. The study involved investigating if loan product and loan amount significantly
predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure. Thus, I chose a quantitative method for the
study. Hoare and Hoe (2013) noted the necessity of applying quantitative methods to
study empirical data and assess hypotheses, relationships, and frequencies of
observations. Because the goal of this research was to investigate whether statistically
significant relationships exist between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure, a
quantitative method met the needs of this study (Howell, 2013). Qualitative and mixed
method approaches involve an in-depth exploration of themes surrounding phenomena
(Palinkas et al., 2015). However, because the purpose of this research was to examine
quantifiable concepts statistically rather than to explore the in-depth and subjective
experiences of individual participants, qualitative and mixed method approaches were not
suitable.
Researchers use correlation designs to examine relationships between variables
and test hypotheses (Howell, 2013). The correlation design was the best choice because
the study involved testing hypotheses. A true experimental design involves applying
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random assignment of data to an archival data set; thus, a correlational design was the
best approach. The outcome of this design was an observation of possible relationships
between loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure.
Research Question
The research question and hypotheses for the study were as follows:
RQ: Do loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure?
H0: Loan product and loan amount do not predict the likelihood of loan
foreclosure.
Ha: Loan product and loan amount do predict the likelihood of loan
foreclosure.
Theoretical Framework
The basis of the theoretical framework for the study was Minsky’s (1986)
financial instability hypothesis (FIH). Minsky noted that financial crises are integral to
capitalist economies because periods of excessive economic prosperity result in
increasingly reckless behaviors by borrowers and lenders. Financial bubbles form as a
result, which later burst and lead to economic crises such as the 2007–2009 recession
(Minsky, 2015). According to the theory, capitalist economies tend to move from periods
of stability to periods of instability, which is often the result of insufficient or poorly
enforced government policies (Minsky, 1986). In this study, the insufficient policies
included poorly enforced home loan lending regulations and the reckless behavior of
lenders approving risky home loans. The specific focus of this study was the predictive
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effect of loan product and loan amount, the predictor variables, on the criterion variable,
which was the likelihood of foreclosure.
According to Minsky (1986), the FIH is a form of market failure, summarized as
follows: success leads to excess, which results in crisis. Successful markets generally
lead to excessive lending by banks in the form of high-risk home loans to poorly
qualified borrowers (Minsky, 1986). Over time, a crisis develops when the borrowers
who agreed to pay such loans can no longer afford the mortgage payments (Minsky,
2015). As a result, borrowers default on home loans, which results in foreclosure, and
mortgage lenders experience significant financial loss.
The larger the loan a lender grants, the more significant the risk for default,
foreclosure, and losses (Caverzasi, 2014). Thus, investment decisions create revenue
streams as well as streams of financial commitments from borrowers. As long as
borrowers fulfill their commitments, the economy remains stable. However, when
borrowers enter foreclosure, financial crises can occur (Caverzasi, 2014), which is
precisely the chain of events that began when the housing market crashed in 2007–2008.
In the wake of the recession, weak housing markets led to large geographic pockets of
homes with negative equity. Thus, Minsky’s (1986) FIH provides a theoretical lens
through which to explore possible correlations among home loan product, loan amount,
and foreclosure.
Definition of Terms
Great Recession: The Great Recession refers to a period of economic downturn in
global markets related to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Peicuti, 2014).
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Housing crisis: A housing crisis refers to an economic condition in which an
increased demand exists for new and existing housing met through a corresponding
increase in borrowed funds and increasing home values at a higher-than-average rate that
leads to risky debt arrangements (Aßmann, Boysen-Hogrefe, & Jannsen, 2013).
Mortgage default: Mortgages in default are over 90 days past due (Anyamele,
2015).
Mortgage delinquency: Mortgages are generally delinquent after nonpayment for
at least 30 days. Delinquency is the stage that occurs prior to default (Anyamele, 2015).
For the purpose of this study, a loan was delinquent when it was between 30 and 89 days
past due.
Mortgage foreclosure: Mortgage foreclosure refers to the process of a lender
repossessing a home when a mortgage borrower misses a monthly payment for a certain
period, usually 3 months (Zhu & Pace, 2015).
Mortgage lenders: Mortgage lenders are institutions within the financial sector
with a focus on brokering, counseling, and providing financial assistance to potential
homeowners (Khan, 2014).
Predatory lending: Predatory lending describes the deceptive practices of
creditors, brokers, or home improvement contractors that involve taking unfair advantage
of a borrower’s lack of knowledge (Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David, Chomsisengphet, &
Evanoff, 2013).
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Securitization: Securitization describes the process of grouping bank assests, such
as mortgages, into marketable securities and transferring the securities into bankruptcyremote organizational entities that finance purchases through issuing securities.
Subprime lending: Subprime lending refers to mortgage-backed financing for
risky borrowers denied access to prime loans (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
Assumptions refer to aspects of research or occurrences the researcher believes to
be true but that lack particular proof (Nkwake & Morrow, 2016). Assumptions are
important in research because assumptions provide a basis for influencing and developing
theories. One assumption about the population of borrowers within the archival data was
that the population would represent similar demographic areas throughout the United
States. Homeowners in Georgia include yearlong residents, as well as vacation
homeowners who visit on a seasonal basis. Another assumption was that the data would
be an accurate reflection of the actual foreclosure rates for the time represented. The
third assumption was that the proper sale of the loan for those who applied and qualified
for prime, Federal Housing Authority (FHA), or subprime loans occurred in good faith
and was free of lending biases such as socioeconomic or racial prejudices (Courchane,
Darolia, & Zorn, 2014).
Limitations
Limitations are issues or circumstances that could curtail the progress of a
particular project or research question investigation (Krupa, 2014). Limitations may be
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of a legal nature or influenced by the sociocultural views associated with the subject in
question (Krupa, 2014). One limitation for this study was that uncontrolled changes in
unemployment rates and unemployment accounted for missed loan payments. The
geographic region that was the source of the aggregate data was five counties in the state
of Georgia.
Delimitations
A study’s delimitations refer to the study’s boundaries (Salvador, 2016).
Important considerations include understanding what to do, reasons for choosing one
aspect over the other, methodology procedures chosen, and the reasons for choosing a
certain subject. A delimitation for this study was the use of archival data from five
counties in Atlanta’s Sixth Federal District in the state of Georgia. Foreclosure data from
the sample included loan type and excluded interest rate, borrower demographic
information, and other economic factors, such as employment rates, that could be factors
in foreclosure. Mortgages included in the data set were only those that borrowers
obtained for single-family homes through mortgage lenders, which excluded any
commercial loans and investment properties used for the sole purpose of collecting rent.
Finally, the selected time frame of analysis, 2013 to 2016, was another delimiting factor.
Significance of the Study
The U.S. housing market functions as a major part of the economy. Many lenders
may reduce losses through a more complete understanding of the riskiness of different
loan types. Results from this study contribute to the field of business, as leaders of
financial entities may be able to create loan packages that are viable, efficacious, and
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more realistic for clients. When lenders ensure borrowers can repay the loans, positive
lending practices encourage loan packages that may prevent future foreclosures. Such
actions can contribute to more effective business practices among lenders, which can free
borrowers from unaffordable loans and contractual traps, such as using financial
incentives that encourage lenders to steer borrowers into more costly loans that keep
borrowers in undesirable financial situations. To create policies to prevent similar
financial crises in the future, factors surrounding mortgage default, such as correlations
between loan product, loan amounts, and foreclosure rates, must be understood (Pajarskas
& Jočienė, 2015). Lenders with improved knowledge and lending practices may make
better decisions to guide them toward less risky loan generation, thus improving profits
and sustainability.
The ramifications of positive lending decisions can discourage the sale of
unsustainable mortgages to a secondary market and potentially provide lenders with
insight into which loan types present the most significant risks based on different factors,
thus contributing to positive social change. Foreclosure creates significant social and
economic crises that ripple throughout society, including low property values and poor
neighborhood quality (Kim, Wilmarth, & Choi, 2016). A better understanding of
foreclosure risk factors, such as loan product and mortgage amount, might help
consumers and lenders make better borrowing and lending decisions.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
The bursting of the housing bubble preceded the Great Recession of 2007, quickly
followed by the exponential increase of foreclosures that reached levels not seen since the
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Great Depression in the 1930s (Peicuti, 2014). The bursting of the housing bubble
triggered a Great Recession that undermined the global economy (Iqbal & Vitner, 2013).
The effects of mortgage defaults in the subprime market spread quickly from banks to
other areas of the U.S. economy, such as corporate bonds (Krainer & Laderman, 2013)
and pension funds (Schwartz, 2012). A lack of sufficient U.S. government regulation led
investors to make risky bets on high-risk securities, which resulted in a recession (Casu,
Clare, Sarkisyan, & Thomas, 2013). The high-risk securities lost value when borrowers
no longer made payments against the loans that composed the security, which
subsequently lost more value as the failure rates grew. Understanding the factors,
consequences, and responses to the Great Recession is important to appreciate the state of
the housing market during that period.
The purpose of this literature review was to explore mortgage loan types and
lending practices related to the ripple effects of the 2007-2009 economic recession
continuing into the next decade throughout parts of the United States. The research
included a general context about borrowers and lenders relevant to the exploration and
analysis of the relationships between loan products, loan amounts, and foreclosure. The
concepts within the literature align through a comparison of contemporaneous peerreviewed research and past theoretical constructs for understanding the mortgage industry
on a macroeconomic level and market challenges affecting lenders. The literature review
may reveal areas for continued research for future researchers. The synthesis of related
literature provides a detailed discussion of Minsky’s FIH, as well as the four major types
of mortgages available to homeowners: (a) prime, (b) subprime, (c) FHA, and (d) U.S.
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Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The major economic factors forming the context
of the subprime lending crisis are (a) U.S. governmental policies and regulations, (b)
securitization and investment vehicles, (c) fraudulent banking practices, (d) housing
prices, (e) unemployment and the economy, and (f) predatory lending.
Literature Review Search Strategy
This review of the literature includes peer-reviewed journal articles from online
databases. I accessed the documents through Google Scholar and the Walden University
library, where a multitude of other databases contained articles for review. Articles
pertinent to this study originated from the following databases: Academic OneFile,
EBSCO, ProQuest, Science Direct, SpringerLink, and Taylor & Francis. Multiple
Boolean searches yielded relevant research using the following keywords: crisis, default,
financial, foreclosure, Great Recession, housing crisis, interest rates, lending, loan types,
mortgage foreclosure, predatory lending, real estate, mortgage companies, prime,
subprime mortgage, and financial instability hypothesis. The number of sources from the
combined search results for these keywords was 376,421. Articles pertained to general
inquiries regarding the housing crisis, foreclosure, mortgage loan types, and the Great
Recession. Of the 136 references, 85% were less than 5 years old from the anticipated
Chief Academic Officer approval date in 2017, and 85% of the references were peer
reviewed. The preliminary search results for the selected keywords and the number of
articles for each searched term appear in Table 1. The total number and percentage of
sources published within the past 5 years and peer reviewed documents used in this study
appear in Table 2.
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Table 1
Preliminary Search Results for Selected Terms
Search term
Great Recession
Housing crisis
Predatory lending
Subprime mortgage
Financial instability hypothesis
Loan types
Subprime lending crisis
Total

Number of articles
166,481
124,783
50,332
161,810
1,291
30,452
3,081
376,421

Table 2
Types of Sources
Reference type
Scholarly sources published after 2013
Scholarly sources that have been peer reviewed

No. of sources
115
115

% of total
84.5
84.5

Financial Instability Hypothesis
According to Minsky (1986), the basis of capitalism is economic expansionism,
followed by financial crises. Minsky did not believe the economic system was selfsustaining and equilibrium-seeking. Rather, Minsky (1992) posited that inflations and
deflations in capitalist economies had the potential to occur rapidly and cause economic
damage. Minsky (1992) posited that increases in indebtedness generally accompany
periods of economic growth because lenders feel confident that borrowers will be able to
repay loans in a generally successful economic climate. Charles (2015) explained such a
climate results in rising debt ratios that balloon to a point where debt begins to threaten
vulnerable economic units.
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As borrowers begin to fail to uphold their financial agreements, leaders of banks
must sharply increase interest rates to compensate. Deflation risks occur when lenders
must sell off assets to pay back debts. Charles (2015) noted that without outside
intervention, recessions could develop into severe depressions, such as the one that
occurred in 1929. As White (2015) explained, Minsky believed that debt-based finance
and intermediaries such as banks were inherently volatile. Thus, the basis of Minsky’s
(1992) FIH is the assumption that capitalist financial systems do not naturally move
toward states of equilibrium; rather, they tend to grow until they explode, which creates a
financial crisis (White, 2015). In the wake of such crises, problems such as high
foreclosure rates and negative home equity can occur.
Minsky (1986) theorized three different categories of risk positions of banks:
hedge, speculative, and Ponzi. Hedge finances are low risk with low leverage,
speculative finances involve slightly higher rates of risk and leverage than hedge, and
Ponzi finances represent the riskiest category with the highest leverage. Subprime
mortgages are an example of a Ponzi system. To prevent financial crises, Minsky (1992)
hypothesized two conditions were necessary: big government and an alert lender of last
resort. Big government describes federal stabilizers and discretionary policies to stabilize
economic demands. The role of the latter, as Chan, Sharygin, Been, and Haughwout
(2013) described, is to (a) provide liquidity so borrowers do not have to liquidate assets,
(b) regulate the financial systems to prevent financial instability, and (c) restructure
existing debts to reduce the burden placed on borrowers. President Obama’s $787 billion
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stimulus package was the government’s attempt to act as a lender of last resort, though
critics disparaged it as merely a collective failure (Epstein, 2013).
Minsky’s (1986) FIH is evident in the economic cycles of the capitalist United
States, especially in the subprime lending crisis, the consequent housing bubble, and the
economic crisis of foreclosure and negative home equity that followed. The cycles of
borrowing and lending and of economic prosperity and crisis are evident throughout U.S.
economic history. Minsky’s suggestion that capitalist economies do not demonstrate a
natural homeostasis that gently pushes them toward stabilization, but rather such
economies are in constant oscillation between economic prosperity and economic
depression, strongly aligned with this study. Periods of economic prosperity precariously
rely upon increasing levels of indebtedness and reliance on future money (Minsky, 1992)
that may never materialize due to borrower defaults and the resulting spikes in interest
rates for all borrowers.
The economic instability generated from poor government regulation and the
resulting financial bubble surfaced during the explosive growth of subprime mortgages
generated in 2005 (Tan & Cheong, 2014). This period of economic growth included
increased subprime lending by banks and other lenders and increased indebtedness
among mortgage borrowers. The economic bubble created by unregulated subprime
lending burst following 2007, indicated by an almost 350% increase in foreclosures in the
United States between 2007 and 2010 (Houle, 2014; Tan & Cheong, 2014). After 2009,
the housing market began to recover slowly, and 2015 was the strongest year for new and
existing home sales since the housing bubble burst (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Thus,
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the housing economy in 2015 demonstrated recovery in many areas. However, regional
pockets throughout the United States, such as counties in the Sixth Federal District,
continue to experience high rates of negative equity that have hampered economic
recovery (Goodman, Zhu, & George, 2014). According to Minsky’s (1992) FIH,
consumers should view any signs of economic recovery with caution, as the market’s
tendency toward oscillation over homeostasis may result in movement toward another
economic bubble.
Palley (2010) noted that a Minskyian view of the subprime mortgage crisis
includes a focus on the instability of financial markets, while new Marxist, Keynesian,
and social structure of accumulation (SSA) interpretations include a deeper focus on the
root causes of economic crises. For example, the new Marxist approach indicates the
crisis was the result of stagnation to which capitalist economies historically return
(Jefferies, 2015). The SSA approach involves viewing the crisis as a contradiction within
neoliberal regimes of capital accumulation and growth resulting from over 30 years of
stagnant wages and income inequality (Palley, 2010). On the other hand, the Keynesian
view focuses on an aggregate demand from structural changes resulting from
neoliberalism.
A post-Keynesian view of the subprime mortgage crisis includes an examination
of several potential root causes, such as failures of international markets, poor financial
regulation, securitization errors in the structuring of low quality assets, shifts toward
financialization, and poorly calculated monetary policies (Koutsobinas, 2010). In
addition, post-Keynesian observers consider the role of stakeholder expectations in the
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financial crisis (Lavoie, 2016). For example, Koutsobinas (2010) contended that
stakeholders can factor many so-called psychological expectations into the collapse of the
housing market, such as (a) expectations for housing appreciation, (b) attempts to
minimize losses by major financial institutions, (c) the too-big-to-fail myth, and (d)
liquidity preferences. Koutsobina argued that the prevalence of the effects of role
expectations in the subprime mortgage crisis was so profound that the period would have
been more appropriately labeled a Keynes moment.
Another theory considered for this study was SSA (Kotz, 2013; Lippit, 2014).
According to the SSA theory, sequences of relatively stable institutional structures occur
in capitalist societies that can last for several decades each. Each of these structures is an
SSA. These SSAs represent coherent sets of institutions that promote capitalist
accumulations for significant periods until institutional contradictions intensify, which
leads to long periods of structural crises (Kotz, 2013; Lippit, 2014). Each of the SSA
crises last until new SSAs replace them (Keaney, 2014). Although the SSA theory can
help explain how such institutional and structural crises arise, the crises examined in
some of the SSA literature do not necessarily reflect severe structural crises (Kotz, 2013).
The subprime mortgage crisis was a severe crisis; thus, SSA theory was not the most
suitable theory for the current study.
Finally, Marxist theorists claimed that the subprime mortgage crisis was the result
of fundamental flaws in capitalism (Jefferies, 2015). According to Marxist theory,
overinvestment creates financial bubbles, and managerial decisions based on the best
financial interests of managers, rather than stakeholders, can emphasize share price over
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value. As a result, failures of financial gatekeepers lead to financial collapse (Hausman
& Johnson, 2014). Although a Marxist interpretation of the subprime mortgage crisis
includes acknowledgement of the financial bubbles inherent to capitalist economies, the
theorists do not consider the constant fluctuations or cycles of economies.
Palley (2010) contended that scholars must view any substantial level of analysis
and policy recommendation of the 2007-2009 crisis using an inferable Marxist-SSAStructural Keynesian lens. The cycle of economic recessions, Palley contended, will
accompany any rework of the financial sector that fails to bridge the gap between
workers’ earnings and economic expansion. Nevertheless, Palley recognized that
Minsky’s (1992) FIH epitomized the financial crisis driven by mortgage lenders and
speculators’ exuberance. Koutsobinas’s (2010) post-Keynesian perspective or the
Marxist-SSA-structural Keynesian lens concerns a much larger dimension or macro level
of the economy. Though Koutsobinas’s post-Keynesian perspective or the Marxist-SSAstructural include valid arguments, they may not be adequate to the level of focus or
analysis for this study. The specific focus of the study was the risk of different loan types
through each phase of economic instability surrounding the crisis; thus, Minsky’s (1992)
FIH was a more appropriate theoretical lens for this examination.
Loan Products
Four major loan types exist for borrowers and are contingent upon income; one
loan type requires current or past military service: conventional, subprime, FHA, and VA.
Borrowers may obtain conventional home loans, termed prime loans, if they (a) qualify
with sufficiently low debt-to-income ratios, and (b) possess required levels of down
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payments and credit scores (Hendrickson & Nichols, 2011). Subprime loans are suitable
for relatively lower wage earners with higher debt-to-income ratios than prime loan
holders and nearly no money available for a down payment (Bhardwaj & Sengupta,
2012). The FHA is a provider of federally guaranteed home loans for low-income
borrowers with credit scores below the threshold for prime loans and spends a larger
portion of income on debt than prime loan holders. Finally, the VA has special pricing
and criteria for home loans for veterans of the U.S. armed services. Primarily,
researchers have focused on subprime loans because of the high failure rates before and
during the subprime lending crisis.
Factors predicting delinquency, such as economic conditions, loan characteristics,
and borrower characteristics, exist across all loan types. Zacks and Zacks (2015)
examined data from 2004 to 2009 and established that borrower income and loan type
were primary determinants of borrowers’ ability to pay mortgages. Thus, the health of
the national economy was an indicator of borrowers’ ability to fulfill mortgage
obligations. Servicer compensation and the high costs of renegotiating loans in default,
accounting standards, and liens junior to the problematic loan impeded loan
modifications (McCoy, 2013). Officials within the Obama administration attempted to
stem two of the factors affecting loans through the Home Affordable Modification Plan
of 2009: loan characteristics and economic conditions (Beckett, 2013; McCoy, 2013).
The president’s proposal to alleviate the harmful effects of the burst of the housing
bubble benefited all stakeholders and the U.S. economy (Beckett, 2013). In addition, the
proposal represented a forceful and effective response to the subprime lending crisis.
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Congress also intervened with the subprime lending crisis to try to correct the problem by
introducing the Home Affordable Modification Plan.
The Home Affordable Modification Plan may result in a significant reduction in
vacant foreclosed homes (Beckett, 2013). Schwartz (2012) examined the state of the
housing sector 5 years after its collapse in 2007 and the most significant policies
implemented by the Obama administration. After investigating President Obama’s
response measures to the foreclosure crisis, the subsequent policies affecting the sector,
and some of the weaknesses in the housing programs, Schwartz noted the executive
branch could not address the housing crisis effectively because of Republican control in
the House of Representatives. Federal congressional and executive branch actions were
not in sufficient balance to promote a safe and positive transition through one of the
greatest economic downturns in American history. Programs such as the Home
Affordable Modification Plan addressed lending and borrowing concerns prior to
foreclosure, but did little to prevent a loan from going into default. Discovering which
loan types are likely to end in default may influence future program success and sound
fiscal practices.
Subprime mortgages. Leaders of financial institutions developed subprime
loans to add diversity to loan portfolios and to extend credit to borrowers who failed to
qualify for prime loans that were the traditional avenues of financing (Bhardwaj &
Sengupta, 2012). Rising home values during the subprime lending crisis lessened the risk
to lenders (Foote & Willen, 2016), as did a robust market in which investors easily sold
foreclosed properties before incurring any appreciable losses. The attractiveness of a
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subprime loan for borrowers who did not qualify for a conventional home loan was the
temporary credit accommodation (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012), the potential for
accumulation of equity within the home, and development of a positive credit history.
Regardless of the fiscally difficult loan terms, the attraction of home ownership enticed
many people into financial situations from which they would be unable to recover.
During changes in FHA programs, subprime lending filled the needs of potential
borrowers (Courchane et al., 2014). Researchers investigated whether lenders coerced
FHA, prime, and subprime borrowers into home ownership through financially unfeasible
avenues. Lack of awareness regarding the mortgage process made borrowers less likely
to search for the best mortgage rate in the market, and they may not have received
sufficient information regarding options. Since 2009, the benefits of optimal mortgages,
including range of expansion, tax advantages, and a decrease in the value of transactions
incurred when purchasing homes, may continue to offer positive alternatives (Cocco,
2013). Consumer complaints have continued about the lack of clear foreclosure laws and
procedures. According to many borrowers, the large number of foreclosures is the result
of a lack of proper communication by lenders regarding the foreclosure process.
A strong correlation exists between subprime mortgages and economic crises such
as foreclosures (Guesmi, Kaabia, & Kazi, 2013). In 2007, when subprime mortgages
became popular among financial institutions, the mortgage crisis expanded and led to
other problems, such as the housing crisis (Guesmi et al., 2013). The mortgage default
crisis started in 2005 and by the end of 2008, the rate of default had reached about 5.2%
(Mayer, Pence, & Sherlund, 2013). An increase in default cases resulted in an increase of
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foreclosure cases across the country, especially for subprime mortgages in which
borrowers defaulted at higher rates than holders of all other mortgage types because
lenders of this type of mortgage usually targeted borrowers with poor credit histories
(Mayer et al., 2013). Many terms and conditions in subprime mortgages caused borrower
confusion, which led to an increase in default cases (Mayer et al., 2013). Contributing to
the default rates were high prepayment penalties that reduced borrowers’ ability to repay
loans in full and discouraged the sale of properties.
The subprime market failure occurred for various reasons, including an increase
in the risk characteristics of subprime loans as opposed to past practices, which were
more conservative. A major cause of the subprime lending crisis was the ineffective risk
reduction methods of financial institutions (Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015). A majority of
lenders failed to conduct an analysis of credit risks and investigate borrowers’ ability to
repay loans. However, the success of the subprime mortgage market in early 2007,
brought about by lower interest rates, mitigated the number of losses and default cases
among subprime loans (Makarov & Plantin, 2013).
Another cause of the subprime lending crisis was easy admittance to the loan
market. For example, insufficient documentation in the subprime loan market led to
increased default rates (Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015). Most financial institution leaders
reduced admittance conditions to obtain high yields and profits (Nelson & Katzenstein,
2014), which encouraged borrowers to make loan commitments without providing
adequate proof of a capability to repay the loans. Lenders could prevent the economic
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downturn that resulted from subprime lending by instituting tighter lending policies and
reduced interest rates (Moulton, 2012).
The subprime housing crisis affected the economy by changing individual and
institutional principles regarding credit (Moulton, 2012). People borrowed money
through home loans that were excessive and beyond borrowers’ means (Prohaska &
Lichtenstein, 2014). Investors ignored standard risk versus reward practices and invested
heavily in the mortgage sector to pursue high returns. Among lessons learned from the
subprime lending crisis were that irresponsible lending and the failure to monitor and
analyze borrowers’ ability to repay loans led to major financial losses (Prohaska &
Lichtenstein, 2014). The risk of having too many subprime loans in a portfolio became
the greatest risk such lenders assumed. If default was to occur, a model of lender
expectations included increased home prices as a reduction in risk (Moulton, 2014). The
model indicated subprime lending was a way for lenders to alleviate default risks if home
prices increased steadily or aggressively. The critical decline in prices undermined
lenders’ ability to calculate favorable risk-to-reward ratios, which harmed institutions and
borrowers.
Subprime mortgages comprised the majority of note defaults and caused a
dramatic increase in the default rate (Pajarskas & Jočienė, 2015). As a result,
securitization developed as a way to minimize mortgage risks and improve efficiency of
the housing market. In addition, the aim is to reduce transaction expenses and ensure
flexibility in financial operations. The role of securitization with subprime loans
contributed to the subprime loan problems in the housing market, such as expedited
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approvals, approvals without proper financial history, and predatory lending (Peicuti,
2013). Securitization increased defaults by about 20% because of the reduced quality of
credit assessments and increased focus on quantity, not quality, of mortgages obtained
(Peicuti, 2013). Securitization weakened incentives for thoroughly assessing customers,
and many high-risk borrowers gained access to mortgages. Apart from poor screening of
borrowers, securitization led to a housing crisis by increasing the complexity of mortgage
products, which made the process difficult and confusing for borrowers to analyze
financial risks effectively (Peicuti, 2013). The ability for financial institutions to package
high-risk, subprime loans into attractive market-based securities enticed the sales of
mortgages to people who were not creditworthy.
Prime mortgages. Private financial institutions typically provide conventional
home loans to well-qualified borrowers who demonstrate fiscal acuity and low risk
(McCoy, 2013). The other term for conventional loans, prime loans, is a reference to a
lending rate close to the prime lending rate set forth by the U.S. Treasury. In 2009, 3% of
prime loans were in foreclosure, 15.1% of subprime loans were in foreclosure, 3.2% of
FHA loans were in foreclosure, and 2.2% of VA loans were in foreclosure (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2012). Credit score analysis of prime loans showed that the home mortgage
lending market became risk averse between 2005 and 2008, where high-risk lending
decreased by half as the crisis began to affect the global economy (Immergluck, 2011).
Several factors affected this trend, including the freezing and contraction of global credit
markets and the continuous decline in home values across the United States and
throughout the world (Immergluck, 2011).
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Prime loans had many of the same negative effects from low loan-to-value ratios,
low credit scores, and variable interest rates. Home prices played a major role in the
housing crisis, in which the effect was much more evident for the subprime lending
market (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2014). Borrowers with prime loans experienced
escalated default rates and poor lending practices, but the percentages were substantially
less than for borrowers in the subprime markets. The same was true for the commercial
markets, where a substantial increase in delinquency occurred. In 2007, commercial loan
delinquency rates were 1.94%, whereas 2010 rates increased to 10.84% (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2012). Subprime markets received attention because of the rates, but the total
dollar amounts for prime and commercial loan delinquencies may have been substantially
higher, which indicates a need for researchers to explore loan products and loan amounts.
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages. Borrowers looking for a
mortgage during the subprime lending crisis had several choices if prime lenders denied
the prime loan application. One alternative was through the FHA, where borrowers
receive loans secured by the federal government and not insured by a private mortgage
insurance company. The FHA facilitates stabilization in housing markets on a national or
regional scale and promotes federal policy through lender services of last resort for
poorly qualified applicants (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012; Quercia & Park, 2013). The
FHA efforts include liberal loan terms, mortgage insurance, and the creation of
nontraditional mortgages (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012). FHA loans differ regarding the
terms within the mortgage, such as interest rates, indemnification risks, and prepayment
penalties (Smith, 2012). Smith investigated the relationship between subprime and FHA
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loans and the disproportionate number of foreclosed properties, which highlighted the
number of borrowers who received subprime loans but could have easily qualified for
FHA loans. The findings from Smith’s study supported economic indicators that showed
more borrowers should choose to pursue FHA loans before going to the subprime market
and possibly stimulating another housing crisis.
Subprime Lending
The United States experienced an economic recession because of the credit crisis
associated with the subprime mortgage crisis (Thakor, 2015). Between 2006 and 2009,
house prices decreased by approximately 32%, and some metropolitan areas, such as
Detroit, experienced decreases greater than 50% (Schwartz, 2012). The effects of the
housing bubble bursting included an increase in mortgage foreclosures (Beckett, 2013)
and the failure of mortgage-backed securities (Prohaska & Lichtenstein, 2014). Multiple
factors contributed to the Great Recession, and some of the effects continue to resonate in
parts of the United States and the world. A discussion of these factors follows.
Liberal lending regulations led to risky investing that eventually caused the Great
Recession; however, other aspects of local and global economies contributed to the crisis
(Gangel, Seiler, & Collins, 2013; Guesmi et al., 2013). As much as the failure of the
subprime mortgage market caused the subprime lending crisis, the economic recession
that followed made the situation worse (Gangel et al., 2013; Guesmi et al., 2013). The
Great Recession led to high unemployment rates in the United States (Rana & Shea,
2015). Consequently, people who could previously afford to service mortgages no longer
had the income to make payments, especially middle-class workers. Unemployment
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without a fiscal safety net led to the inability to pay mortgages (Agarwal, Deng, Luo, &
Qian, 2016; Gyourko & Tracy, 2014; Schwartz, 2012; Shi & Riley, 2014; Tatom 2013).
The rise of unemployment rates reflected the decline of the United States economy and
global economies and consumers had to choose between paying their mortgages and
meeting the essential survival needs of their families (Keene, Lynch, & Castro, 2014).
Prior to the housing crisis, for consumers with medical expenses, medical bills became
catastrophic financial obligations for families already struggling to pay their mortgages
(Courchane et al., 2014). Borrowers, especially those with subprime mortgages, were in
a financial maelstrom that negatively affected multiple aspects of their daily lives.
Also contributing to the mortgage failure rates was the exponential decrease in
home values (Gyourko & Tracy, 2014; LoPucki, 2014; Shi & Riley, 2014). Investors
used rising home prices as part of the lending equation to justify risky investments in
subprime borrowers, which would have offset losses had home values remained level or
showed limited increases (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012). A contagion effect occurs when
home values within a city or neighborhood begin to decline rapidly because of default
(Kaabia & Abid, 2013); conditions that cause more defaults and are responses that
fostered the recession (McCoy, 2013). Previously thought of as a stable investment,
homes were no longer a source to build equity.
The deregulation of banking opened new and riskier markets for mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities and made consumers vulnerable to fraudulent practices
termed predatory lending (Dymski, Hernandez, & Mohanty, 2013; Mayer, Cava, &
Baird, 2014). Prior to the collapse of the markets, securitization was a financial vehicle
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used to diversify account holdings and open up credit (Casu et al., 2013); however, the
rampant formation of these securities led to the demise of many financial institutions.
During the recession, extensive losses within the banking industry led to closing high-risk
product offerings, as well as conventional credit offerings (Gangel et al., 2013;
Ramcharan, Verani, & Van den Heuvel, 2016). Business leaders were unable to secure
loans for daily operations and forced to reduce labor costs and reduce the scale of
business performed.
Many factors contributed to the Great Recession and the collapse of the housing
industry in 2007, which had national and global ramifications (Casu et al., 2013).
Although the foreclosure crisis began a year prior to the Great Recession, researchers
disagree on the depth of its influence on the recession. For example, Tatom (2013)
posited that the Great Recession was not the result of the mortgage foreclosure crisis, but
a symptom of poor financial policies that led to the failure of many institutions dependent
upon the housing industry. Despite differing theories on the origination of the Recession,
a close link exists between the Great Recession and several striking trends in the United
States, including increased foreclosures, a rising unemployment rate, and a rapid decline
in housing prices (Rana & Shea, 2015). For example, practical models of mortgage
nonpayment showed unemployment was a recognized risk factor that affected borrowers’
leverage (Gyourko & Tracy, 2014). Rana and Shea (2015) found that foreclosures were
not indicators of a depressed economy, but that shocks to foreclosures resulted from a
substantial increase in the rate of unemployment and a significant decline in housing
prices.
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Predatory Lending
Predatory lending is the act of imposing unethical loan conditions on customers
(Choplin & Stark, 2013). The practice of predatory lending was among the factors that
contributed to the housing and subprime mortgage crisis, and contributed to the increase
in the number of loan default cases by about one third (Agarwal et al., 2013). Lenders
have access to private information regarding borrowers and borrowers’ ability to repay
loans and some lenders who engaged in predatory lending were aware of borrowers’
inability to pay a mortgage (Agarwal et al., 2013). Loan terms imposed made future
repayment of the loans impossible for borrowers. Lack of strategies to measure the
effects of predatory lending on mortgage performance led to predatory lending (Agarwal
et al., 2013).
State and federal interventions. Although the housing crisis highlighted the
problems associated with predatory lending, the practice has been ongoing (Hendrickson
& Nichols, 2011; Neuenschwander & Proffitt, 2014). Corrective efforts at the U.S.
federal and state levels were an attempt to resolve the challenges caused by the practice.
However, in 2004, the federal comptroller of currency preempted state laws to create a
situation in which banks were not subject to state laws. The action undermined
antipredatory efforts at the state level. Hendrickson and Nichols (2011) reported that
bank performance improved significantly after the ruling by the comptroller, when a
bank’s charter governing operations and the lending laws changed in response to such
rulings. Thus, federal regulation of the banking industry is more effective than state-level
regulation, which indicates a need for federal regulation within the housing industry.
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Mayer et al. (2014) noted that the present laws were ineffective in curbing predatory
behavior among lenders. Future researchers could establish which changes will make the
federal law more effective in reducing foreclosures.
Effect on subprime lending crisis. Lenders used predatory lending to make their
offers attractive to a large number of borrowers (Mayer et al., 2014). The aim of
predatory lending is to comply with requirements to make borrowers aware of the risks
involved using complex mortgage terms (Mayer et al., 2014). Predatory lending is a
major problem in the contemporary housing market and had a significant role in creating
the subprime lending crisis in the country (Agarwal et al., 2013). The problem of
predatory lending worsened because of numerous avenues that lenders used to issue
subprime loans that undermined the national economy by selling products that people
could not pay for because politicians were unable to define the problems and create
appropriate legislation to prevent the problems (Bubb & Krishnamurthy, 2015).
Elimination of the practice is likely because of concerted efforts from numerous parties.
Industry stakeholders need to define the term and create appropriate policy measures and
laws based on that definition (Bubb & Krishnamurthy, 2015).
Antipredatory laws. The subprime lending crisis revealed the need for effective
antipredatory laws at the state level (Curtis, 2013). In addition, the crisis led to a
discussion about whether the U.S. federal government made a mistake by limiting the
influence of state antipredatory laws. Investors used the variations in state laws and the
federal regulatory environment to determine the impact of the federal preemption of state
antipredatory laws on the quality of mortgages originated by the preempted lenders.
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Ding, Quercia, Reid, and White (2012) found that the default risk was high among
lenders who received exemptions from strong state antipredatory laws. In particular, the
observation was clear among refinance mortgages that had adjustable interest rates (Ding
et al., 2012). The preemption of state mortgage lending regulations might result in a
significant increase in mortgage default risks that undermine consumer protection (Ding
et al., 2012).
A result of the subprime lending crisis was recognition of the need to carry out a
comprehensive examination of the market to determine how a loan type can lead to
mortgage fraud (Stowell, Barker-Cagwin, & Fellows, 2012). Distressed economic
conditions in the country and rapid decline of housing values were an enabling
environment for fraudulent lending (Stowell et al., 2012). Stowell et al. found that a need
existed for greater vigilance within the housing market. Immergluck (2011) described
solutions to foreclosures using programs that would reduce foreclosure rates and their
influences in U.S. society. Investment in education for lenders and borrowers may stem
the cases of fraud and fraudulent tactics within institutions.
Community Reinvestment Loans
Community reinvestment loans are a loan type lenders typically make available to
low-income families and individuals. The purpose of this loan is to promote home
ownership in economically distressed areas of a city, county, or state. One of the causes
of the crisis was lending laws introduced to increase people’s ability to own homes
(Bourassa, Haurin, Hendershott, & Hoesli, 2013; Hendrickson & Nichols, 2011);
however, no sufficient regulations existed to prevent financial institutions from offering
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bad loans (Hendrickson & Nichols, 2011). One example of a lending law that increased
mortgage risks was the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. The purpose of this act
was to ensure the institutions met the needs of community members, ensure equality
when providing loans to community members, and force banks to give loans to lowincome families that did not qualify for loans (Brescia, 2014). Another example of such
lending laws is the Affordable Housing Act that led to lower mortgage standards, which
also encouraged many low-income earners to obtain mortgages. A requirement in the
Act was reduction of mortgage charges through subsidies that resulted in bank leaders
introducing subprime mortgages and led to the subprime lending crisis.
High rates of unemployment affected low-income families who had fewer sources
from which to pay mortgages compared to moderate-income households (Agarwal,
Amromin, & Ben-David, 2014). Quercia, Pennington-Cross, and Yue (2012) focused on
the mortgage default rate for low-income families, and investigated loan type, borrower
demographics, and foreclosures. Borrowers who eventually defaulted on the home loan
received mortgages without assessing their capability to pay on the note, because in the
United States people associate owning a house with many financial advantages and better
living standards (Quercia et al., 2012). To find a correlation between low-income
borrowers and default rates, Quercia et al. (2012) used community reinvestment loan data
and studied the chances of terminating mortgages by low-income families and moderateincome families. The study indicated that the default rate was higher among low-income
households compared to moderate-income families and economic conditions affected
low-income households extensively compared to moderate-income families (Quercia et
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al., 2012). Community reinvestment loans have high default rates, but the factors and
terms of the loans are similar to prime and subprime loans with parameters for
determining if the borrower is not a good fit for a home loan.
Negative Effects of Terms Within a Mortgage
As discussed in the section on subprime mortgages, interest rates and credit scores
affect borrowers’ ability to pay a mortgage (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012). The effects of
these terms within a mortgage extend beyond the subprime market and have an adverse
relationship within the other markets, such as prime and FHA. Prather, Lin, and Chu
(2013) investigated absolute and relative credit risks in the mortgage market. The
significance of Prather et al.’s study was to establish a correlation between choices,
prices, and default rates of five mortgage products in both a normal and a stressed
economy. Prather et al. found mortgage terms with default rates that were four times
higher than conventional fixed-rate loans, and the default rates of some mortgage types
rose to 30%. These findings indicated the need for consumers to study the credit risk of
multiple mortgage products before making a purchase decision.
Adjustable rates. Because of legislation, leaders of lending institutions
structured loans to make the loans affordable to possible homeowners, which established
a mix of varying interest rates (Johnson & Li, 2014). The new products were
nontraditional, and fixed-interest rate products were traditional and common practice
during the past decades. Lin, Prather, Chu, and Tsay (2013) examined the risks involved
in traditional and nontraditional mortgage products and found that the nontraditional
mortgage products had higher default risks. Factors such as unwillingness to pay,
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payment shock, and consumers’ inability to pay were the causes of high risk (Lin et al.,
2013). Regardless of low interest rates at the initial phases, all the risks transferred to
borrowers. Borrowers unlikely to repay debts would favor an agreement with a huge
prepayment fine, whereas borrowers who were more likely to prepay loans would prefer
an agreement with a high interest rate and smaller prepayment fine (Bian & Yavas,
2013).
The monetary policy of the Federal Reserve may have contributed to the subprime
lending crisis that followed the economic downturn in 2007 and the subsequent negative
macroeconomic developments (Spencer & Huston, 2013). Spencer and Huston (2013)
collected and analyzed empirical data and found that the data were in agreement with
data from other researchers who believed that monetary policy between 2002 and 2005
stimulated the low federal funds rate. Moreover, Spencer and Huston’s findings
supported Alan Greenspan’s and other economists’ view that the links between the
housing market, long-term rates, and short-term rates deteriorated between 2002 and
2005. Poor monetary policies served to encourage the development of the subprime
lending crisis (Foote & Willen, 2016). Monetary policies such as bank rates can affect
house valuations. The federal government established relationships between the housing
market and monetary policies, such as the long-term and short-term federal rates.
Spencer and Huston provided relevant information on how the performance of the
housing market, particularly pricing, depends on the monetary policies in place during a
specified period, which supports the claim that poor monetary policies in an economy
contribute to a subprime lending crisis.
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In an investigation of the relationship between lenders’ and customers’ choices,
default rates, and house prices, Shi and Riley (2014) established that the default rate for
adjustable-rate mortgage products was higher when compared to fixed-rate mortgage
products. Various factors were the cause of this difference, and one factor was that
borrowers who choose adjustable-rate loans were mostly high-risk borrowers (Shi &
Riley, 2014). The popularity of the adjustable-rate product is a factor that contributed to
the subprime loan crisis in 2005 (Foote & Willen, 2016). Economic conditions in a
country are more likely to affect those who choose adjustable-rate loans, which in turn
affect default rates. Default rates were high when many borrowers chose adjustable-rate
mortgages, which increased the probability of payment shock when rates increased (Shi
& Riley, 2014).
Credit risks. Borrower demographic characteristics, income, and fiscal history
are factors that lenders considered during the lending process (Courchane, Kiefer, &
Zorn, 2015). Borrowers’ credit history gives a quantifiable understanding of the
propensity to meet credit obligations on time. Furthermore, the cumulative credit score a
borrower maintained is an acceptable indicator within the financial realm (Hyra, Squires,
Renner, & Kirk, 2013). Because of credit risks, tools such as hybrid loans were
instrumental in stretching income and accommodating diverse demographic trends for
borrowers. The market replaced other types of products to retain the possibility of having
credit.
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Government Intervention
The Obama administration and the U.S. Congress attempted to stem the effects of
the subprime lending crisis and prevent further damage through legislation and programs
to help to those most affected by falling house prices (Bratt & Immergluck, 2015). The
devastation of the subprime lending crisis on homeowners, banks, and the U.S. economy
forced political leadership to intervene. Entire cities and regions of the country
experienced the effects of the subprime lending crisis, and federal and state authorities
attempted various approaches to prevent further damage to the economy. These
legislative acts resulted from the need for political leadership to protect the American
dream of home ownership (Avramenko & Boyd, 2013; LoPucki, 2014).
Legislation. A realization of ordinary Americans’ economic hardship from the
subprime mortgage crisis led to the formulation of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief
Act of 2007 (Avramenko & Boyd, 2013) to reduce foreclosure and stem lenders’ losses.
Political leaders designed legislative measures to enable lenders to face the crisis without
suffering severe economic hardship. However, some of the laws failed to work as
expected because of constitutional issues. For example, the intentions of the Helping
Families Save Their Homes Act (Homes Act) was to enable families to save their homes
and reduce home foreclosures with easy mortgage loan modifications. Such laws might
increase the appeal of nonpayment by extending the foreclosure procedure and the time
borrowers who have stopped paying the mortgage can stay in their homes without rent
debts (Demiroglu, Dudley, & James 2014). Demiroglu, Dudley, and James (2014)
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examined the differences in state foreclosure laws and the effect of those laws on the
cases of nonpayment in the residential mortgage market.
Lawsuits. Establishing national laws allows for a debate of state-level legislation
to control for predatory borrowing and monetary institution foreclosure activities. The
antipredatory laws were effective in reducing common broker practices and decreasing
mortgage fraud, yet are expensive, are challenging to implement, and remain uncertain as
to the efficacy (Baumer, Arnio, & Wolff, 2013). The subprime lending crisis led to a
significant increase in lawsuits involving mortgages. The 1993 Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank Supreme Court ruling prevented bankruptcy among Americans whose
home values had fallen (LoPucki, 2014). LoPucki (2014) identified a precedent that
would allow judges to accept the loan modification plans, which would serve the best
interests of the U.S. economy, homeowners, and lenders. An examination of legislation
and lawsuits may lead to solutions to problems and suggestions for regulatory measures
and legislative acts.
Suggested Preventive Measures
In an effort to limit the severity of the damage, the U.S. federal government
attempted to reduce the number of foreclosures, although progress was slow.
Consequently, the focus of recent research rests on trying to determine the availability of
effective models for understanding housing prices and housing market behavior
(Burnside, Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 2016). For example, Clark (2011) examined the
efficacy of the utility model of housing market behavior and the hedonic price model to
test if both were still relevant models in an increasingly uncertain housing market. The
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housing sector may influence policy models in the future; however, Clark (2011) noted a
need for new models that acknowledge changes in the housing market. One measure
Clark proposed was for the market to change forecasting models with changes in
economic conditions.
Policies. Researchers provide important insights regarding how policy makers can
influence the housing market in a positive direction by formulating and implementing
policies for managing foreclosures (Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014). In 2009, the federal
government implemented various forms of federal assistance, including the Home
Affordable Foreclosure Program and the popular Home Affordable Modification
Program in many parts of the United States as forms of financial relief to millions of
people with an impending foreclosure (Zhu, Janowiak, Ji, Karamon, & McManus, 2015;
Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014). However, none of the supporters of these programs claimed
the relief programs were adequate for the affected mortgage holders, particularly those
from the most affected areas of the United States (Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014). Mayhew
and Mayhew (2014) suggested that because of the housing foreclosures, authorities in
Richmond, California, realized erosion was reducing the tax base of the economy. To
prevent further erosion of the tax base, the authorities in Richmond recommended
acquiring mortgages through the eminent domain process and modifying loans to make
them affordable (Mayhew & Mayhew, 2014). Mayhew and Mayhew concluded that
depending on the types of policies formulated and implemented, authorities tend to
promulgate policies that will sustain the tax base, which potentially affects housing
pricing and contributes to the subprime lending crisis.
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The severity of the subprime lending crisis indicated the need to develop effective
measures to ensure such challenges do not endanger the U.S. economy again (Foote &
Willen, 2016). The crisis affected the servicing of mortgages in the industry overall, and
dislocations and bankruptcies affected banks. However, the people harmed the most
were homeowners who lost their homes because of the inability to pay the home loan.
The failure of the banking institutions to implement due diligence served to encourage
the lending crisis (Russell, Moulton, & Greenbaum, 2014). The responsible government
authorities failed to regulate mortgages given prior to the subprime crisis. As a result,
Russell et al. (2014) suggested that efforts to ensure the subprime lending crisis does not
occur again must address several fundamental concerns: (a) The federal government
should implement stringent regulatory oversight over the securities and lending industry;
(b) the individuals and institutions responsible for creating the 2007-2009 subprime
lending crisis should be accountable; (c) lenders need to overcome barriers to
participation, such as stigma, lack of information, or incomprehensible information
regarding the lending process, to decrease the impact of another crisis (Russell et al.,
2014).
The subprime lending crisis prompted intense public debate regarding the nature
of the housing market. Multiple views exist regarding the influence of the prevailing
nature of the housing market on the crisis. Weak regulatory oversight played a
substantive role in creating an enabling environment for the subprime lending crisis to
occur (Jefferson, 2013). The financial industry leaders’ unwillingness to participate
restricted the programs in place from benefiting distressed homeowners, and bank
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leaders’ decisions to participate in loan restructuring were voluntary (Jefferson, 2013).
The loss of trust in the financial industry and homeownership values challenged cultural
and moral beliefs in the American dream of home ownership and the connection with
banks (Jefferson, 2013). According to Madhavi (2014), the U.S. mortgage industry could
improve by using callable covered bonds, strict and comprehensive underwriting, the
application of recourse mortgages, and strict regulation.
Securitization. The goal of securitization is to safeguard against high-risk loans
because such loans have a higher propensity for violation and lead to foreclosures. Casu
et al. (2013) investigated whether lenders improved their performance by practicing
securitization in an effort to assess credit risk. Scrutinizing banks was productive
because the effort easily exposed credit risk (Casu et al., 2013). Despite such credit risk
assessments, commercial banks continued to incur increased funding costs after funding
structure improvements (Casu et al., 2013). Krainer and Laderman (2013) also
investigated the valuation of securitized loans and found that loans offered through
securitization were riskier because lenders securitize loans to spread risks to clients,
which leads to lower loan performance. In the California mortgage market in 2000
private loan securitization contributed to poor loan performance by reducing the quality
of mortgage standards. The regulation of loan prices and securitization led to lower
mortgage charges in privately securitized loans (Krainer & Laderman, 2013).
Ethical lending and mortgage terms. Lenders have a responsibility to meet
public objectives influenced by factors such as government regulations and funding
(Moulton, 2012). Moulton (2012) examined a group of private mortgage lenders who
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participated in public lending programs, and found many institutions continued to have
riskier loans, although some did not. Avoidance of high risk-loans among private
mortgage lenders was in response to regulatory oversight forcing the institutional leaders
to act in publicly responsible ways. Different organizations had different publicly
responsible behaviors because of varied strategic and institutionalized reactions to
political authorities (Moulton, 2012). An increase in political authority will not
necessarily make lenders acquire responsible behaviors. Reduced house prices and an
increased number of subprime and alternative mortgage products caused the mortgage
crisis, which contributed to the high rate of foreclosures and defaults (Cox, Brounen, &
Neuteboom, 2014). Many people do not understand the loan terms described in mortgage
notes; however, those who do understand the details of the terms make better decisions
regarding purchasing homes with alternative loans (Cox et al., 2014). Chiang and SaAadu (2013) proposed a financial training service and advice for potential borrowers to
reduce errors associated with investments.
Transition and Summary
Between 2007 and 2009, millions of foreclosure cases occurred, and millions
more homeowners were vulnerable to foreclosure (Geanokoplos, 2014). Subprime
mortgage holders represented the greatest amount of default as a percentage compared to
prime, FHA, and VA loan borrowers. Multiple factors contributed to the default rates of
prime and subprime mortgages, primarily adjustable rates, early payment penalties, and
credit scores (Geanokoplos, 2014).
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The purpose of this review of the literature was to provide a comprehensive
analysis and synthesis of the existing body of research on the subprime lending crisis,
loan types, and predatory lending. The focus of Section 1 was to present a foundation to
examine if loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The
following section includes a description of the project with discussions of the research
method, design, population and sample, data collection and analysis, and ethical research
procedures.
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Section 2: The Project
This section includes an overview of the research method, data collection, and
data analysis procedures used in this study. First, this section includes a restatement of
the problem and a discussion of the role of the researcher, followed by discussion of and
a rationale for the selected research method and design. Additional sections include
descriptions of the population and sample, ethical assurances, the data collection
instrument, the data collection procedure, the proposed data analysis process, and issues
of study validity. This section concludes with a brief summary and transition.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine if loan
product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The predictor
variables were loan product and loan amount. The criterion variable was foreclosure.
The population consisted of data records of mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry,
Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in
Georgia, between 2013 and 2016. Lenders may use results from this study to improve
their understanding of factors associated with increased foreclosure risks. Implications
for positive social change include improved stakeholder understanding of the correlations
among loan product, loan amount, and foreclosure, which may be useful to develop and
implement less risky lending policies.
Role of the Researcher
The study involved collecting data from an archival source: CoreLogic. I had no
active role or relationship with the agency and no knowledge of any of the mortgagors
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associated with the housing loans. The research setting was the state of Georgia, where I
am a licensed realtor. Because the study included only archival financial data, there were
no human participants.
Researchers must adhere to basic ethical principles in conducting studies. The
Belmont Report includes an outline of the ethical principles for research involving human
participants (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, 1978). I maintained basic ethical principles when accessing
and using the data. The data did not include any demographic information for the
mortgagors; therefore, there was no risk of identification or privacy violation. A
representative from CoreLogic provided a data sample. The topic of the research
questions was the relationship, if any, among loan product, mortgage amount, and
foreclosure.
Research Method and Design
Research Method
I used a quantitative method to examine the research question by collecting and
analyzing mortgage data from CoreLogic, which was an archival source. Using
quantitative methods is the most effective approach to a study that involves empirical
data (Yilmaz, 2013). The goal of the research was to establish whether significant
relationships exist between loan product, mortgage amount, and foreclosure, so a
quantitative method was appropriate. A qualitative method is appropriate for assessing
individuals’ subjective experiences, but the quantitative method is the best choice for
assessing relationships among several objectively measurable variables (Davies &
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Hughes, 2014). A qualitative method was not suitable for this study because the problem
and focus of the study did not involve the subjective experiences of individuals.
The use of a mixed method approach would have been unsuitable because adding
a qualitative component to the study would not aid in addressing the research question. A
mixed method approach is most appropriate when researchers need to conduct an initial
exploratory analysis to determine what factors may influence the variables of interest.
Researchers who use the quantitative method can objectively quantify and measure
specific variables of interest and determine if significant relationships exist between the
variables using statistical analysis (Howell, 2013; Yilmaz, 2013). Therefore, the
quantitative method was the most appropriate approach to examine the relationships
between the predictor variables, loan product and loan amount, and the criterion variable,
foreclosure.
Research Design
To assess the research question, this study included a correlational design. A
correlational design is appropriate when investigating relationships between predictor and
criterion variables (Howell, 2013). The goal of the study was to investigate the
relationships between loan product, mortgage amount, and foreclosure. Thus, a
correlational design was the best approach for addressing the research question. Other
types of quantitative designs that received consideration included the experimental
design, but it was not suitable for the study. Experimental designs are appropriate when
the goal of the research is to determine cause-and-effect relationships by manipulating
and controlling the predictor variables (Howell, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). In an
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experimental design, a researcher must be able to assign participants to conditions or
groups randomly (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). I could not randomly assign group
membership for this study. Thus, an experimental design was not suitable for this study.
Population and Sampling
The population consisted of data records dated between 2013 and 2016 for
mortgage holders in Clayton, Henry, Rockdale, Fulton, and Spalding counties of the
Atlanta Sixth Federal Reserve District in Georgia. Data collected for the target
population were archival records concerning loan product, mortgage amount, and
foreclosure. The source of the sampling frame was the CoreLogic Company. The
sampling method was a probabilistic simple random sample taken from the sampling
frame. Specifically, I used the select-cases command in the Statistical Packages for
Social Science (SPSS) to draw cases from the sampling frame data set randomly. A
simple random sample is an appropriate sampling method to obtain a sample
representative of the population (Emerson, 2015; Howell, 2013; Uprichard, 2013).
Conducting a power analysis was necessary to determine the minimum sample
size needed to conduct the analysis. Power refers to the ability to find a significant
difference in a sample when a relationship exists in the population. Statistical power
refers to the ability of a test to capture significance and is equivalent to one minus the
probability of a Type II error, which refers to not finding significance in the sample when
it occurs in the population (Field, 2013). A Type I error occurs when a researcher rejects
a null hypothesis when it is true. Thus, a Type I error equates to finding significance in
the sample when it does not exist within the larger population (a false positive). To
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combat these errors, the study included the conventional values for power (.80), alpha
level (.05), and effect size (medium). Unless the theory guiding a study dictates the use
of other values, experts recommend applying these conventional values (Field, 2013;
Kraemer & Blasey, 2015). With the predetermined parameters of alpha = .05, power =
.80, and a medium effect size, I used G*Power 3.1.9.2 to calculate an appropriate sample
for a logistic regression. Based on these calculations, a sample of 473 cases was
sufficient for the analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).
Ethical Research
Because the data in this study were archival, fewer ethical requirements were
necessary compared to research with human subjects. No informed consent was
necessary, as the study included only archival data. No direct contact with any of the
mortgagors occurred, and the data did not include personal information from any of the
mortgagors. There were no incentives to participate in the study because data collection
was already complete. Documentation outlining permission to use the archival data
appears in Appendix A. Receiving Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for the
archival data was necessary (Walden IRB approval no. 06-08-17-0434302). For retention
purposes, data used in the research will remain on my computer in a password-protected
folder for 5 years to ensure the confidentiality of the data such that no one else has access
to the loan data. Five years after the completion of the dissertation, I will delete the data.
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Data Collection
Instrumentation
The study did not involve defined instruments. Data for the variables of interest
came directly from loan records provided by CoreLogic. CoreLogic has access to loan
information in the state of Georgia and provides this information for research purposes. I
selected the information to measure variables directly in order to answer the research
question. The creation of constructs was unnecessary, and concerns of validity did not
pertain to the data.
Loan product. Loan product served as a predictor variable with measurement on
a nominal scale. A nominal scale is a scale that involves discreet categories that do not
follow any sequential order (Field, 2013). According to the data code sheet principles
CoreLogic provided, the types of loan products specified in the data included community
development authority, conventional, FHA, farmers home administration, leasehold
mortgage, private party lender, U.S. Small Business Administration, VA, and wraparound
mortgages. For the data analysis, loan product was dummy-coded with the largest loan
category in the sample serving as the reference group.
Mortgage amount. Mortgage amount in U.S. dollars served as a predictor
variable. Mortgage amount was a ratio-level variable. In a ratio level of measurement,
the values of the variable are such that equal differences in intervals between values
represent equal differences in values, and the values have a true zero point (Field, 2013).
Specifically, mortgage amount was the total amount of the loan in U.S. dollars.
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Foreclosure. Foreclosure served as the dichotomous criterion variable, with two
levels: foreclosure and no foreclosure. For data analysis coding purposes, Pallant (2013)
assigned the value of “0” to whichever response indicates a lack or absence of the
characteristic of interest. Foreclosure was the characteristic of interest. Therefore, I
assigned “0” to no foreclosure and “1” to foreclosure.
Data Collection Technique
Data consisted of archival data. Researchers collect archival data prior to a
research study for varied purposes, and such data are available for researchers to use and
analyze (Brakewood & Poldrack, 2013). Advantages to using archival data are the speed
and efficiency of obtaining data already collected, the reduction of cost and burden on
potential participants by maximizing the use of collected data, and the reduction of cost
and burden on the researcher (Brakewood & Poldrack, 2013; Fecher, Friesike, & Hebing,
2015). Disadvantages to using archival data are the increased potential for breaches in
participant confidentiality and the limitations to the populations, time periods, and
variables that are available in the data (Brakewood & Poldrack, 2013).
The archival data came from a third party, CoreLogic, that had access to loan
information in the state of Georgia. After providing the specific variables of the study, I
received permission from an authorized individual in the organization to use the data. A
representative of the organization obtained the data upon request and sent them as an
Excel spreadsheet along with a codebook that described the variables within the data file.
The advantage of using an external organization is that the data collection is already
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complete. Thus, the study included data collected systematically by members of a
financial organization rather than data collected using smaller scale sampling procedures.
Data Analysis
The research question and hypotheses for this study were as follows:
RQ: Do loan product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure?
H0: Loan product and loan amount do not predict the likelihood of loan
foreclosure.
Ha: Loan product and loan amount do predict the likelihood of loan
foreclosure.
Binary logistic regression, as used in this study, is an appropriate statistical
analysis when the goal of the research is to examine the relationships between multiple
predictor variables and a single binary criterion variable (Field, 2013; Stevens, 2009).
Researchers use binary logistic regression to predict an event with two possible outcomes
based on a set of predictor variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012), and researchers use
logistic regression to determine the extent to which the likelihood of an outcome
increases or decreases as the values of the predictor variables increase or decrease (Field,
2013). Therefore, binary logistic regression was appropriate for this study as I assessed
the likelihood of predictor variables predicting loan foreclosure.
Other predictive analyses considered included multiple linear regression and
discriminant analysis. Multiple linear regression is a statistical technique researchers use
to predict values of an interval or ratio-level variable (Field, 2013; Stevens, 2009;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Therefore, multiple linear regression was not appropriate
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because the criterion variable investigated was not an interval or ratio-level variable.
Finally, the use of discriminant analysis is appropriate when attempting to predict a
categorical outcome based on multiple predictor variables, but may be less robust and
carries more stringent assumptions than logistic regression (Field, 2013). Therefore,
discriminant analysis was not appropriate for this study.
I screened the data for any missing values or outliers. Cases with missing values
for the variables of interest (e.g., loan product, mortgage amount, or foreclosure) were not
part of the study. Outliers underwent examination prior to analysis. Stevens (2009)
noted that an outlier is a value greater than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean. Any
observations of mortgage amount identified as outliers did not remain part of the study.
Additionally, testing the assumptions of the statistical analysis helped ensure statistical
conclusion validity. The three assumptions within logistic regression concern (a) sample
size, (b) multicollinearity, and (c) outliers. Assessment strategies and any actions
necessary if the data showed a gross violation of the assumptions remained part of the
study.
Sample Size
The first assumption of binary logistic regression was that the sample size was
sufficiently large to obtain statistically valid results. I ensured the satisfaction of this
assumption by sampling no fewer than the minimum number of cases, as indicated by the
power analysis. The power analysis indicated the requirement of a minimum of 473
cases.
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Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity refers to the degree that predictor variables correlate with each
other (Stevens, 2009). Binary logistic regression requires that the predictor variables do
not correlate too highly (Menard, 2009; Stevens, 2009). Testing for multicollinearity
involved using variance inflation factors. According to Menard (2009), variance inflation
factor values greater than 10 indicate significant multicollinearity among the predictor
variables. Removal of the appropriate predictor variables from the regression model
occurs if there is an assumption violation.
Outliers
Binary logistic regression calculations function correctly if no outliers are present
in the data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Stevens (2009) defined an outlier as a value
greater than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean. Determining outliers of the
mortgage amount variable occurred prior to analysis, followed by exclusion from analysis
of any cases containing outliers.
Computation and tabulation of the binary logistic regression involved the
following statistics: (a) beta, (b) standard error, (c) Wald value, (d) degrees of freedom,
(e) p value, (f) odds ratio, and (g) 95% confidence interval for odds ratio. Beta is the raw
regression coefficient calculated for each predictor variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).
The standard error is a measure of the variability in the regression coefficient
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). The Wald value is the test statistic for the significance of
the regression coefficient and follows a chi-square distribution (Field, 2013). The
degrees of freedom refer to the number of values that are free to vary in the calculation of
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the significance test (Field, 2013). The p value represents the probability of obtaining a
coefficient as extreme as the observed coefficient if the true value in the population was
zero (Field, 2013). The p value also helps interpret the significance of the results. If the
p value is less than .05, the result is significant. The odds ratio represents the change in
likelihood of the outcome coded as “1” for each one unit change in the predictor variable
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Finally, the 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio is
the confidence interval for the value of the odds ratio. The expectation was the
confidence interval would contain the true value of the parameter in 95% of samples
(Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder, & Wagenmakers, 2014). I used SPSS Version 24.0 (IBM
Corp., 2016) as a tool for data analysis.
Study Validity
External validity refers to the ability to generalize results to the larger population.
Because the data collected included mortgages from counties of the Atlanta Sixth Federal
Reserve District in Georgia, which is the U.S. district with the highest rate of foreclosed
homes in the country (Alm et al., 2014; Georgia Watch, 2010; Raymond, 2016), the
sample served as an adequate representation of the population. By including at least 473
observations, the power of the analysis was high enough to find significance if it existed
in the larger population.
Statistical conclusion validity refers to the extent that results of data analysis are
accurate and valid. Strategies for mitigating threats to statistical conclusion validity
consisted of ensuring that the sample size was sufficient to draw valid conclusions from
the data analysis and that no major violations existed of the statistical assumptions for
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binary logistic regression. Use of power analysis determined the minimum sample size
required for the analysis, and testing the assumptions of binary logistic regression took
place prior to analysis.
Transition and Summary
Section 2 included a discussion of the methodology of the study, the reasoning
behind conducting a quantitative correlational design, the use of archival data and
variables, and the reasoning behind conducting a binary logistic regression. The section
also included details about the data collection and data analysis. Section 3 consists of the
data analysis, results, and an interpretation of the findings.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine if loan
product and loan amount predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The predictor
variables were loan product and loan amount. The criterion variable was foreclosure.
Data analysis led to rejecting the null hypothesis and supporting the alternative
hypothesis. Loan product and loan amount significantly predicted the likelihood of loan
foreclosure.
Presentation of the Findings
This subsection includes a discussion on testing the assumptions, descriptive
statistics, inferential statistics, and the findings as they relate to theory. Specifically, I
tested the assumptions of sample size, multicollinearity, and outliers. The inferential
statistical test conducted to address the research question was a binary logistic regression.
Tests of Assumptions
The study involved evaluating the assumptions of sample size, multicollinearity,
and outliers. Ensuring a sufficient sample size involved randomly sampling 473 cases
from the archival data obtained from CoreLogic. The random sampling involved using
the select-cases procedure in SPSS. The initial data set obtained from CoreLogic
contained 52,394 cases, and the evaluation of multicollinearity involved using variance
inflation factors. Menard (2009) noted that variance inflation factor values greater than
10 indicate significant multicollinearity among predictor variables. All variance inflation
factors were below 10 (see Table 3); therefore, the data met the assumption of
multicollinearity.
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Table 3
Variance Inflation Factor Values for Predictor Variables
Predictor
Loan product (Reference: conventional)
Federal Housing Authority
Private party lender
Veterans Administration
Loan amount

Variance inflation factors
1.07
1.03
1.05
1.01

Evaluating outliers involved calculating the number of standard deviations each
value for loan amount was from the mean. Stevens (2009) defined outliers as values
more than 3.29 standard deviations from the mean. Nine values of loan amount were
more than 3.29 standard deviations above the mean, and there were two values of “1” for
loan amount. I excluded these cases from the analysis, which left a final of 462 cases
included in the analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
There were 52,394 cases in the CoreLogic data set, with 473 cases randomly
sampled from the data set for this study. Eliminating 11 cases due to outliers resulted in
462 cases for the analysis. Loan amounts ranged from $2,984 to $175,524,452 (M =
$1,212,634; SD = $11,965,553). Table 4 includes the descriptive statistics for loan
product and foreclosure.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Loan Product and Foreclosure
Variable
Loan product
Conventional
Federal Housing Authority
Private party lender
Veterans Administration
Foreclosure
Not in foreclosure
Foreclosure

Frequency

%

275
120
20
47

59.5
26.0
4.3
10.2

447
15

96.8
3.2

Inferential Results
The study included binary logistic regression to examine if loan product and loan
amount predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The predictor variables were loan
product and loan amount. Data analysis involved dummy-coding loan product, with the
largest loan category (conventional) serving as the reference group. The outcome
variable was foreclosure. The null hypothesis was loan product and loan amount do not
predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The alternative hypothesis was loan product
and loan amount do predict the likelihood of loan foreclosure. The preliminary steps
taken to assess the assumptions of sample size, multicollinearity, and outliers revealed no
serious violations of the assumptions (see the Tests of Assumptions subsection above).
The alpha level chosen to determine statistical significance was .05.
The binary logistic regression model was significant, χ2(4) = 10.65, p = .031,
Nagelkerke R2 = .09. The Nagelkerke R2 value indicated that the model explained 9% of
the variability in foreclosure. Because the binary logistic regression model was
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significant, data analysis led to rejecting the null hypothesis and supporting the
alternative hypothesis; therefore, loan product and loan amount significantly predicted
the likelihood of loan foreclosure. Statistics for each binary logistic regression predictor
are in Table 5. The dummy-coded loan product category of FHA was a significant
positive predictor (B = 1.71, p = .015). The odds ratio for this predictor indicated that
FHA loans were 5.52 times more likely to be in foreclosure than conventional loans. The
dummy-coded loan product category of private party lender was not a predictor (B =
1.55, p = .190). The dummy-coded loan product category of VA was a significant
positive predictor (B = 2.12, p = .007). The odds ratio for this predictor indicated that
VA loans were 8.31 times more likely to be in foreclosure than conventional loans. Loan
amount was not a significant predictor (B = 0.00, p = .892).
Table 5
Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Foreclosure
Predictor
B SE Wald df
Loan product
(Reference: conventional)
1.71 0.70 5.94 1
Federal Housing
Authority
Private party lender
1.55 1.18 1.71 1
Veterans Administration 2.12 0.78 7.32 1
Loan amount
0.00 0.00 0.02 1
2
Note. χ (4) = 10.65, p = .031, Nagelkerke R2 = .09.

95% CI odds ratio
Sig. Odds ratio Lower Upper
.015

5.52

1.40

21.83

.190
.007
.892

4.69
8.31
1.00

0.46
1.79
1.00

47.41
38.50
1.00

In summary, the binary logistic regression conducted to answer the research
question was significant, which indicated that loan product and loan amount significantly
predicted the likelihood of loan foreclosure. Specifically, FHA loans (compared to
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conventional) and VA loans (compared to conventional) were significant positive
predictors, meaning that FHA and VA loans were significantly more likely to be in
foreclosure than conventional loans.
Applications to Professional Practice
The driving force behind business operations is creating value for stakeholders.
In cases where entities face an expansion of business to create such value, it is tempting
to assume greater risk in expectation of greater rewards. However, as evidenced by the
subprime mortgage crisis, such is not always the case. Particularly in situations where
mortgage-backed securities are the majority of an organization’s investment portfolio, the
variables with regard to those mortgages could mean the difference between success and
disaster.
The application of the current research to professional practice is to provide a
litmus test for the likelihood of loss associated with an individual loan, a mortgage
package, or a portfolio based largely upon mortgage-backed securities. Understanding
the link between the particular mortgage type and its inherent risk allows business leaders
to make decisions based upon their acceptance or aversion to risk. Organizations whose
leaders are risk-accepting can have portfolios with large percentages of FHA or VA
loans, with an awareness of the increased risk of loss associated with such investments.
The leaders of those risk-averse organizations looking for slow and steady growth can
avoid such packages and opt for safer investments involving conventional loans or, in
some cases, avoid mortgage-backed securities entirely.
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Findings from this study generally supported Minsky’s (1986) financial instability
hypothesis, which posits that successful markets often lead to excessive lending by banks
in the form of high-risk home loans to poorly qualified borrowers. Over time, a crisis
develops when the borrowers who agreed to pay such loans can no longer afford the
mortgage payments (Minsky, 2015). As a result, borrowers default on home loans, which
results in foreclosure, and mortgage lenders experience significant financial loss.
Findings from this study revealed that FHA and VA loans were significantly more likely
to go into foreclosure than conventional loans. Thus, the high default rate among
borrowers of VA and FHA loans was reflective of the financial instability hypothesis.
Borrowers of VA and FHA loans may be more likely to take on mortgages and loan
payments they cannot keep up with than are borrowers of conventional loans.
The elevated foreclosure risks associated with FHA loans demonstrated in this
study supported findings from previous research. FHA loans promote lending to poorly
qualified applicants (Bhardwaj & Sengupta, 2012; Quercia & Park, 2013) through liberal
loan terms, mortgage insurance, and nontraditional mortgages (Bhardwaj & Sengupta,
2012). However, the riskiness of FHA loans indicated in this study revealed that such
loans might be more risky than previously estimated. For example, in 2009, 3% of prime
loans were in foreclosure, 15.1% of subprime loans were in foreclosure, 3.2% of FHA
loans were in foreclosure, and 2.2% of VA loans were in foreclosure (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2012). Thus, census data from 2009 indicated that FHA and VA loans were at
lower risk for foreclosure, but data from this study indicated these two types of loans had
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a significant association with foreclosure. The implication for practice is that lenders
seeking to avoid risks should avoid FHA and VA loans.
Implications for Social Change
The implications for positive social change include improved stakeholder
knowledge and understanding of variables contributing to foreclosure, which may
potentially be useful in developing and implementing less risky lending policies.
Improved lending decisions may discourage the origination of unsustainable mortgages
and potentially provide lenders with insight into which loan types present the most
significant risks based on various factors. Moreover, lenders may experience fewer
losses in their mortgage and investment portfolios resulting in increased profitability.
The findings in this study may also prove to be beneficial to future borrowers.
Increased knowledge on which loan products present the most risk will aid borrowers in
making better informed decisions prior to securing their home with a mortgage. Thus,
preventing homeowners from losing their homes in foreclosure and upholding property
values in the community.
Recommendations for Action
The results of this research indicate a clear need for lenders and investors to
institute policies requiring the disclosure of the types and percentages of loan products
included in all portfolios. Findings also indicate a need for increased regulation around
the qualifications for FHA and VA loan products to decrease the risks associated with
such products. The findings from this study call into question the extension of mortgage
loans to individuals who may not be able to meet their obligations to such commitments.
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Findings from this investigation may be salient to a variety of stakeholders,
including mortgage lenders and borrowers. A practical way to disseminate results is to
create a white paper to distribute to interested stakeholders. Additional forms of
dissemination may involve presenting the findings at professional and academic
conferences or using the findings to create trainings for borrowers and lenders.
Recommendations for Further Research
Recommendations for further research include the area of subprime mortgages,
the extension of credit to individuals lacking appropriate credit scores and capital, and the
ways portfolio mix can guard against catastrophic losses. Extension of the current
research beyond the state of Georgia may help to eliminate the potential for geographic
bias in the sample included in the study. Both of these suggestions rely on an assumption
that lenders use the same criteria for underwriting and approval processes.
Future researchers may also examine why borrowers of FHA and VA loans are at
a greater risk for default than borrowers of conventional loans. Another direction for
future investigation would be to examine the effectiveness of different types of loan
counseling for reducing default risks among VA and FHA borrowers. Replicating this
study in different areas of the country could reveal geographic differences that exist in the
default risks associated with different loan types.
Reflections
Reflecting on the Doctorate of Business Administration doctoral study process
has led me to an understanding of my preconceived notions and the personal biases
brought to the work. I found myself inserting my assumptions about individuals with
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questionable credit scores into the work and predetermining their failure before
completely reviewing the outcomes. I came to understand that doctoral-level research
involves a great deal of bracketing and setting aside of prior knowledge as a way to
approach problems with a clear mind and fresh ideas.
Conclusion
The results of this work revealed that, although the need for subprime lending
exists in the United States, the oversight and regulation of such mortgages needs to
improve. Many Americans dream of home ownership that would be out of reach if they
do not have access to loan products that allow them to obtain mortgages without great
sums of capital. Those who have experienced credit challenges in the past may also
benefit from such loans if they have improved their ability to make loan payments.
Although eliminating these products is not a recommended action, the clear correlation
between their existence and the increased risk of default sheds light on the importance of
increased regulation and disclosure associated with such products.
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